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I. INTRODUCTION
In Troxel v. Granville, a 2000 Supreme Court decision, four United
States Supreme Court justices determined in a plurality opinion that the
"liberty interests of parents in the care, custody, and control of their chil-
dren" (herein childcare interests) generally foreclose states from compelling
requested grandparent childcare over current parental objections.' Yet,
these four justices recognized that "special factors" might justify judicial
interference as long as the contrary contemporary wishes of parents were
accorded "at least some special weight."2 The plurality, and one concurring
justice, reserved the question of whether any "nonparental" visitation, pre-
sumably encompassing not only grandparents, but also stepparents, siblings
and others,3 must "include a showing of harm or potential harm to the
child."4 Yet, the concurring justice, Justice Souter, hinted that at least some
nonparental visitation could be based solely on a preexisting "substantial
relationship" between a child and a nonparent and on "the State's particular
best interests standard."
' Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (O'Connor, J., joined by C.J. Rehnquist & JJ. Ginsburg &
Breyer) (plurality opinion) ("perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court."); id. at 68-69 ("so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will
normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question
the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children.").
See generally Donald Leo Bach, The Rapanos Rap: Grappling with Plurality Decisions, 81 U.S.L.W.
468 (2012) (analyzing plurality opinions).
2 See Troxell, 530 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion) ("if a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here be-
comes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own
determination.").
See, e.g., In re Marriage of James & Claudine W., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 464 (Cal. App. 2d 2003) (apply-
ing Troxel analysis to stepparent visitation request).
4 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 (plurality opinion) ("we do not consider ... whether the Due Process Clause
requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as
a condition precedent to granting [nonparent] visitation."); id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring); see also
McGarity v. Jerrolds, 429 S.W. 3d 562, 570-71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (establishing harm where it is
required); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.18(2)(a)(i) (2002) (suggesting that harm is not always needed to support
court orders for childcare and that "a grandparent or other relative who has developed a significant rela-
tionship with the child" can seek childcare, where "the parent objecting to the allocation has not been
performing a reasonable share of parenting functions for the child."); Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law
Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, app. I
(2013) (comparing state grandparent and other third party visitation statutes that do not explicitly require
the loss of a relationship with a third party to cause harm).
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 76-77 (while not every nonparent should be capable of securing visitation upon
demonstrating a child's best interests, perhaps a nonparent who establishes "that he or she has a substan-
tial relationship with the child" should be able to petition if the state chooses) (Souter, J. concurring).
An exemplary statute is VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(b) (Repl. vol. 2008) stating "[t]he court shall give
due regard to the primacy of the parent-child relationship but may upon a showing by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the best interest of the child would be served thereby award custody or visitation to
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Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, not unlike Justice Souter, observed that a
best interests standard might be constitutional where the nonparent acted
"in a caregiving role over a significant period of time,"6 hinting that such a
nonparent might even be afforded "de facto" parent status.7 A second dis-
senter, Justice Scalia, seemingly agreed, noting the need for both "grada-
tions" of nonparents and carefully crafted state law definitions of parents.9
A third dissenter, Justice Stevens, added that because at least some children
in nonparent settings likely "have fundamental liberty interests" in "pre-
serving established familial or family-like bonds," 0 nonparents seeking
childcare must be distinguished by whether there is a "presence or absence
of some embodiment of family.""
Thus, while important, current parental objections to nonparent childcare
desires are not always dispositive. 12  Since Troxel, the United States Su-
preme Court has said little about nonparent childcare over current parental
objections. It has not addressed the special weight, special factors, harm or
potential harm, de facto parenthood, children's fundamental liberty inter-
any person with a legitimate interest" and an illustrative case is In re Parental Responsibilities of M.W.,
292 P.3d 1158 (Colo. App. 2012) which employed COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123 (2014).
6 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 98-99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Cases are sure to arise .... in which a third par-
ty, by acting in a caregiving role over a significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a
child which is not necessarily subject to absolute parental veto . . . . In the design and elaboration of
their visitation laws, States may be entitled to consider that certain relationships are such that to avoid
the risk of harm, a best interests standard can be employed by their domestic relations courts in some
circumstances.").
' Id. at 100-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[A] fit parent's right vis- -vis a complete stranger is one
thing; her right vis- -vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another.").
' Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Judicial vindications of 'parental rights' .... requires .... judi-
cially defined gradations of other persons (grandparents, extended family, adoptive family in an adop-
tion later found to be invalid, long-term guardians, etc.) who may have some claim against the wishes of
the parents.").
' Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Judicial vindication of 'parental rights' . . . requires ... a judicial-
ly crafted definition of parents.").
'o Id. at 88 (Stevens, J. dissenting). But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) (the
Court has not "had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her
parent, in maintaining her filial relationship"); In re Meridian H., 798 N.W.2d 96 (Neb. 2011) (no
recognition of a federal or state constitutional right to continuing sibling relationships with a sister upon
the termination of parental rights regarding the sister, where the sister was placed in foster care and the
two older siblings were adopted); Jill Elaine Hasday, Siblings in Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897 (2012)
(urging courts, legislatures, and scholars pay better attention to "sibling relationships," concluding:
"Family law's narrow focus on marriage and parenthood inherited from the common law and then end-
lessly replicated without normative scrutiny, has constrained critical thinking in family law for too
long.").
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12 Comparably, one parent's objection to placement for adoption is not always dispositive when the oth-
er parent agrees and placement clearly and convincingly serves the child's best interests. See, e.g., In re
C.L.O., 41 A.3d 502, 504 (D.C. 2012).
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ests, or family-like bonds.13 Since Troxel, state legislatures have extensive-
ly refined their third party childcare laws.' 4 Various state high courts have
heard new challenges to these childcare laws." State legislators and judges
differ when examining the "harm or potential harm," "special factors" and
"special weight" that can justify judicial interference with parental "liberty
interests" via court orders on grandparent childcare over current parental
objections. Not surprisingly, interstate variations appear. 6 As the United
States Supreme Court has recognized, the regulation of domestic relations
rests within the "virtually exclusive province of the states.""
Since Troxel, there has been an upsurge in primary or significant child-
care by grandparents, as well by other nonparents, including the intimate
partners (male or female) of single parents who cohabit, where the single
parents are often unwed birth mothers ." As a result, there continue to be
' One distinguished commentator said about Troxel:
Troxel did more to confuse than clarify the law in the area of grandparents' rights laws. On the one
hand, the case can be read broadly as reaffirming that parents have a fundamental right to control the
upbringing of their children and as providing a basis for invalidating orders for grandparent visitation
over the objection of fit parents. On the other hand, Troxel can be read as a very narrow decision that
involved a particularly broad law applied in a situation where the parent was fit and regular grandparent
visitation still occurred. The absence of a majority opinion makes it even more difficult to assess the
impact of the decision other than the certainty that it will lead to challenges to grandparents' rights law
throughout the country.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 833 (4th ed. 2011).
14 Robyn L. Ginsberg, Grandparents' Visitation Rights: The Constitutionality of New York's Domestic
Relations Law Section 72 After Troxel v. Granville, 65 ALB. L. REV. 205, 205-06 n.2 (2001) (list of
grandparent visitation statutes).
' See Sonya C. Garza, The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State Courts and Legislatures, 69
LA. L. REv. 927 (2009) (review of post-Troxel state cases on the constitutionality of such statutes); see
also, Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't Know Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental
Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865 (2003) (earlier review of such statutes).
16 See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 4, at 18, app. I (demonstrating variations in, inter alia, laws on great-
grandparents; burden of proof; and necessity to show harm). Interstate variations also appear for state
law definitions of parents and for state laws on stepparent visitations. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Par-
entage Law (R)Evolution: The Key Questions, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 743 (2013) (discussing parents); Jef-
frey A. Parness, Stepparent Childcare in Illinois, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing step-
parents).
" Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (residency requirement for divorce petitioner). But see
Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (describing the long
history of some federal family status determinations). Of course, the states may provide greater protec-
tions of parental rights than are afforded by the federal constitution. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hunter, 771
N.W.2d 694, 711 (Mich. 2009) ("Nothing in Troxel can be interpreted as precluding states from offering
greater protection to the fundamental parenting rights of natural parents, regardless of whether the natu-
ral parents are fit. This rule applies here.")
" See, e.g., Rose M. Kreider & Renee Ellis, Living Arrangements of Children: 2009, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, June 2011 (especially Figure 1, historical living arrangements of
children, 1880-2009, and Table 1, selected 1991-2009 figures showing more and more children not liv-
ing with two married parents and living with single parent or grandparents only); Stephanie J. Ventura &
Christine A. Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, 1940-99, NAT'L VITAL STAT.
REP., Vol. 48, No. 16, 1, 2 (Oct. 18, 2000) ("The percent of births to unmarried women rose almost
TROXEL REVISITED
many third-party childcare disputes in the state courts, as well as disputes
over new forms of parentage. While court-compelled nonparent childcare,
over current parental objections, can arise either from standing of a third-
party individual or from a type of newly-recognized parental status, often
third-party standing is the only available avenue for nonparents because
most new forms of parenthood cannot be employed where there are already
two parents under law.19
New de facto parent statutes and cases present a scheme for approaching
third-party childcare that does not envision a singular approach to judicial
assessments of the special weight to be accorded current parent wishes or
the harm or potential harm to children. De facto parentage laws increasing-
without interruption from 1940 (3.8 percent) to 1994 (32.6 percent ... From 1994 to 1999 there was
little change ... it was 33.0 percent in 1999")); Facts About Children Being Raised by Grandparents, IL
DEP'T ON AGING (2014), http://www.illinois.gov/aging/communityservices/caregiver/pages/grg facts.a
spx (over 200,000 children under 18 living in grandparent headed households, with over 40,000 grand-
parents "responsible for their grandchildren for 5 years or more"); J. Herbie DiFonzo, How Marriage
Became Optional: Cohabitation, Gender, and the Emerging Functional Norms, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 521, 523 (2011) (increasing parenting by single parents and relatives); Lynn D. Wardle, Dilem-
mas of Indissoluble Parenthood: Legal Incentives, Parenting, and the Work-Family Balance, 26 BYU J.
PUB. L. 265, 270 (2012) (increasing parenting by unwed couples and by single parents, mostly mothers).
Increasing parenting by grandparents, and other relatives, seemingly arises, in part, because of the 2008
Federal Fostering Connections Act. Federal Fostering Connections Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(29)
(2012) (within 30 days of removal of child from parental custody, state must exercise "due diligence to
identify and provide notice to all adult grandparents and other relatives" and explain options involving
kinship guardianship); see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78A-6-307(7), (18)(c) (2012) (when a child re-
moved from parental custody, preference for placement of the child shall be given to "a relative of the
child"); see, also, Judith T. Younger, Families Now: What We Don't Know Is Hurting Us, 40 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 719, 722, 733 (2012) ("glaring need for reliable data" on "what is really happening in intimate
relationships"). The rising numbers of unwed cohabiting couples has also prompted much litigation over
property distribution upon separation as well as future childcare. See, e.g., In re Kelly & Moesslang, 287
P.3d 12 (Wash. App. 2012) (applying equitable "committed intimate relationship" doctrine to unwed
separating couple who lived in a marital-like relationship and acquired what would have been communi-
ty property had there been a marriage). To the extent the disputes involve contracts, there may be con-
trolling statutes. See, e.g., Cavalli v. Arena, 42 A.3d 250 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2012) (new statute,
N.J. Stat. 25:1-5(h), requires palimony pacts to be in writing and be subject to independent attorney re-
view and advice (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5(h) (West 2010)).
' While most American states do not recognize the possibility of three (or more) parents for any child, a
few do. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. § 7612(c) (West 2014) (no need to choose between two presumed parents,
like a husband of the birth mother and one who holds himself/herself out as a parent, when making a
choice "would be detrimental to the child"); T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So.2d 873 (La. 1999) (holding "dual
paternity" possible in both husband and biological father where husband's marriage to birth mother had
been dissolved and where child's best interests would be served); Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847, 854
(La. 1989) (holding that two men may have "paternal rights" in child, as well as child support obliga-
tions). Three parents have also been recognized as possible in New Jersey where a birth parent's earlier
consent to a stepparent's performance of parental duties leads the stepparent to now possibly be a psy-
chological parent, even though a second parent, here a formal adoptive parent, may not have consented
to such duties. K.A.F. v. D.L.M., 96 A.3d 975 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (requiring stepparent to
show "exceptional circumstances" and the child's best interests to gain a court-ordered childcare order
over the birth parent's current objection). On the need for emergence of a three (or more) parent family,
see, for example, Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (2008).
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ly recognize that a single parent's current objection to a new second parent
carries less "weight" when the single parent explicitly consented to and
strongly fostered a "substantial" parent-like relationship between his or her
child and the aspiring second parent. Comparably, third-party childcare -
without second parent status - should also be given less weight accorded to
current parental preference. This is another instance where third-party
childcare laws would effectively recognize that the objecting parent earlier
acquiesced in a diminishment of his or her superior parental authority, re-
sulting in a greater opportunity for third-party childcare. 0
This article will first explore the new de facto parent state laws originat-
ing in both statutes and cases. These laws often limit current parental deci-
sionmaking about childcare due to an earlier conscious or implicit ceding of
parental authority. The article will then examine current third-party child-
care laws, including those specially addressing stepparents and grandpar-
ents. The analysis will show that such laws typically do not comparably
limit current parental decisionmaking due to earlier ceding of parental au-
thority, making third-party childcare more difficult because of requirements
like "harm or potential harm to the child." Finally, the article suggests a
new approach to third-party childcare founded on a justifiable diminution of
parental rights due to earlier ceding by existing parents that better serves
children and third parties with preexisting "substantial" relationships with-
out infringing unduly upon the "liberty interests of parents in the care, cus-
tody and control of their children." The analysis considers whether such an
approach should be employed for all third parties, or just for certain third
parties like stepparents or grandparents.
II. DE FACTO PARENTHOOD LAWS
Parentage under the law is increasingly recognized long after birth for
individuals without actual or presumed biological ties and without formal
adoption ties.21 Recognition can come via precedent; in Wisconsin, case
20 It is a far more difficult case where only one of two existing parents earlier acquiesced in diminished
parental authority. See, e.g., K.A.F., 96 A.3d at 983 (holding that stepparent of minor child, a former
domestic partner of biological mother, may have childcare standing due to earlier birth mother's consent
though no such consent by adoptive parent of child).
21 Herein the other noted state statutes and precedents on parentage and nonparent childcare are assumed
to meet the Troxel standards on losses or diminishments of superior parental rights, whatever those
standards may be. Some non-Illinois laws seem of questionable validity. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. §
19-7-1(b.1) (2014) (providing that disputes over custody between parents and, e.g., grandparents, aunts
or siblings, "parental power may be lost" if a court, exercising "sound discretion and taking into consid-
eration all the circumstances . . . determines" such losses serve the childrens' best interest, though there
is "a rebuttable presumption" favoring parental custody).
TROXEL REVISITED
law recognizes "psychological parent" or "second parent" status. 22 These
new types of parentage only arise for a third party when an existing parent
has earlier consented to a parent-like relationship between a child and the
third party.23 But often there are these new forms of parentage, defined by a
statute, which is a preferred approach for those concerned about inappropri-
ate judicial lawmaking.24 These cases and statutes carry varying labels be-
sides psychological parent, including de facto parenthood, presumed
parenthood, equitable adoption and parentage by estoppel. Herein they are
collectively labelled de facto parent laws.
Incidentally, similar labels can have different meanings from state to
state. For example, in Delaware, by statute a de facto parent, on equal foot-
ing with a biological or formal adoptive parent, can be judicially recognized
for one who had "a parent-like relationship" with "the support and consent
of the child's parent;" who exercised "parental responsibility;" and who
"acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established a
bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in na-
ture." 25  By contrast, in the District of Columbia, by statute, an individual
may only seek "third-party custody" as a "de facto parent" if he or she lived
with the child since birth or lived in the same household with the child for
at least 10 of the 12 months preceding the filing of his or her custody re-
quest.26  Comparably the New Jersey Supreme Court substantially adopted
22 See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (consent, parent-like relationship, fi-
nancial support, and "bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature") . The Wisconsin precedent
has generally been employed elsewhere, though sometimes under a different doctrinal name. See, e.g.,
P.B. v. T.H., 851 A.2d 780 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (finding that neighbor of custodial maternal
aunt was "psychological parent" of child, standing "in parity with the legal parent"); V.C. v. M.J.B., 725
A.2d 13, 22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) ("We apply the Wisconsin H.S.H.-K. test to evaluate
whether visitation should be considered in the best interests of a child where there is no express statutory
authorization."); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005) ("To establish standing as a
defacto parent we adopt the following criteria, delineated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court").
23 In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421 ("the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and
fostered, the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child").
24 Compare Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A.3d 416, 424-25 (Vt. 2014) (declining to formulate de facto parent
doctrine as "the Legislature is better equipped", while noting some other state courts have declined to
fill the "perceived vacuum"), with Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169, 1176-77 (Me. 2014) ("Parenthood is
meant to be defined by the legislature, steeped as it is in matters of policy requiring the weighing of mul-
tiple viewpoints .... Although we have been discussing de facto parenthood for almost thirteen years,
there is currently no Maine statutory reference to de facto parenthood. We take this opportunity to again
emphasize that, given the evolving compositions of families and the need for a careful approach, this
issue would be best addressed by the Legislature. In the absence of Legislative action in such an im-
portant and unsettled area, however, we must provide some guidance to trial courts faced with de facto
parenthood petitions.").
25 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2014) (the three factors to attain "de facto parent status"). But
see Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 750 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (finding statute overbroad and violative
of fit mother's and father's due process rights as relates to the mother's boyfriend).
26 D.C. CODE § 16-831.01, 831.03 (2001) (with parental "agreement"). De facto parenthood can also
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the Wisconsin high court's psychological parent doctrine, but employed it
in third-party childcare rather than a "second parent" setting.2
De facto parent statutes sometimes recognize parentage presumptions.
These presumptions may, but need not be, dependent upon marriage. At
times, natural ties are presumed. Some parentage presumptions establish a
minimum time period of earlier childcare.
In Illinois, a man is presumed "to be the natural father of a child" if "the
child is born or conceived" during his marriage to the birth mother, or if he
and the birth mother married after the child's birth and he is listed as the fa-
ther on the child's birth certificate.28 Elsewhere, a marital paternity pre-
sumption arises for a man married to a birth mother who bears a child "dur-
ing the marriage."29 In Missouri, a man "shall be presumed to be the
natural father of a child if .. . He is obligated to support the child pursuant
to a written voluntary promise."3 i Minnesota, a man is "presumed to be
the biological father of a child if . .. while the child is under the age of ma-
jority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as
his biological child."31 In Indiana, there is sometimes a comparable "rebut-
table presumption,"32 which must include "the consent of the child's moth-
er" 33 and, "to establish the man's paternity," a positive genetic test.34 In Al-
abama, the presumed parent statute requires "a significant parental
relationship with the child" involving emotional and financial support.35 In
Wyoming, a man "is presumed to be the father of a child if ... For the first
lead to third party custody or visitation under a de facto parent approach in an ABA subcommittee pro-
posal of October 11, 2012. See Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to
Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, 25-30 (2013).
27 V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 2000) (utilizing an "'exceptional circumstances' category
(occasionally denominated as extraordinary circumstances) that has been recognized as an alternative
basis for a third party to seek custody and visitation of another person's child.").
28 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5 (2014).
29 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-14-7-1 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWs ch.
209C, § 6 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.051 (2013).
so Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.822 (2014) (showing that this obligation seemingly can arise without
"court order," as such an order is another way the obligation prompting a presumption can arise, and that
where two conflicting presumptions arise via conduct in Missouri, the controlling presumption is the one
"founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic"), with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208 (2013)
(showing that there is a presumption in Kansas where a man "notoriously or in writing recognizes pater-
nity," which need not involve a voluntary paternity acknowledgement).
3' Compare MINN. STAT. § 257.55 (2014) (showing that where two presumptions arise via conduct in
Minnesota, the controlling presumption is the one "founded on the weightier considerations of policy
and logic"), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-105 (2014), and MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105 (2014)
(showing the presumptions to be similar).
32 IND. CODE § 31-14-7-2(a) (2009).
33 Id.
34 IND. CODE § 31-14-7-2(b).
3 ALA. CODE § 26-17-204 (a)(5) (1975) (effective Jan. 1, 2009).
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two (2) years of the child's life, he resided in the same household with the
child and openly held out the child as his own."36 Where natural ties are
statutorily presumed, the lack of ties will not necessarily result in a rebuttal
of the presumption.3
Legal parenthood without biological or formal adoption ties does not al-
ways involve presumptions. For example, there are comparable doctrines
involving in loco parentis38 or de facto parentage.39 All such doctrines ef-
fectively permit informal adoptions, that is, adoptions without traditional
governmental oversights such as background checks and home visits. Here,
the prior criminal acts of informal adopters are only considered after the re-
quests for new parent status have been honored. Thus, such prior acts will
often only help to determine whether to grant childcare to newly recognized
parents seeking court orders over the objections of earlier recognized par-
ents, usually birth or formal adoptive parents.
Whatever their label, de facto parentage laws, that is, laws recognizing
legal parenthood without biological or formal adoptions ties, vary in their
requirements on explicit consents by existing parents to any new parentage.
As noted, such consent is required in Delaware where to attain "de facto
parent status," an individual must have "a parent-like relationship" with
"the support and consent" of the child's parent(s).40 Comparably, in Indi-
ana, a man is presumed to be the biological father of a child where the man
36 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v) (2015); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204 (a)(5) (2015);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204 (a)(5) (West 2003).
" See, e.g., Alisha C. v. Jeremy C., 808 N.W.2d 875, 884-85 (Neb. 2012) (holding former husband, un-
der NEB REV. STAT. § 43-1412.01 (2008), may set aside earlier divorce court finding of presumed mari-
tal paternity, but only if in the child's best interests, there was no adoption, and the husband did not
acknowledge paternity while "knowing he was not the father"). Sometimes natural ties are presumed for
one who could never have such ties. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (d) (West 2014) (stating that a man is pre-
sumed to be a natural father if he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child); S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. App. 2011) (reading CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (d)
(West 2011) to include female partners of birth mothers).
3 See e.g., Morgan v. Weiser, 923 A.2d 1183, 1187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (stating once established,
rights and liabilities arising from in loco parentis relationship are exactly the same as between biological
or formal adoptive parent and child).
" See. e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.13, § 8-201(a)(4) (2014) (mother); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.13, § 8-201(b)(6)
(father); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.13 § 8-201(c) (to attain "de facto parent status" one must have "a parent-
like relationship" with "the support and consent of the child's parent"; one must have exercised "paren-
tal responsibility"; and one must have "acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have
established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature").
40 DEL. CODE ANN. tit.13, § 8-201(c) (de facto parent must show "the support and consent of the child's
parent or parents who fostered the formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship between the
child and the de facto parent").
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receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his own
with "the consent of the child's mother".4
By contrast, implicit consent to new de facto parentage by existing par-
ents seems to be required where residency in the child's home is required,
as mandated by some parentage presumption laws that lack explicit consent
mandates.42 Some of these de facto parent laws require a certain or definite
period of residency (like two years),43 while others do not.44 Consent is im-
plied due to voluntary cohabitation.
The acquiescence of existing parents to new de facto parent recognitions
seems far more attenuated in other state laws. For example, in New Jersey
a man can be presumed to be the biological father of a child if he "openly
holds out the child as his natural child" and "provides support for the
child." 45 In Alabama, a man can be a presumed father if, "while the child is
under the age of majority," he "openly holds out the child as his natural
child ... and establishes a significant parental relationship with the child by
providing emotional and financial support for the child." 46 This is another
instance where an existing parent's consent to new parentage of the child
may be implied but the likelihood of actual consent is lessened.
Regardless of the express state law conditions on de facto parentage,
some degree of earlier acquiescence to nonparent childcare is compelled
seemingly by the federal constitutional interests of existing parents in the
care, custody and control" of their children.4  Yet, only some de facto par-
ent state laws have expressly recognized the relevance of the earlier paren-
" IND. CODE § 31-14-7-2(b) (2009).
42 WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v) (2015); see, e.g., Tx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (West
2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, 8-204 (a)(5) (2015).
43 Compare WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v) (presuming father if residency in same household for
two years of child's life), and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5), with NEV. REV. STAT. §
126.05 1(1)(b) (2007) (stating a "man is presumed to be a natural father of a child if .... He and the
child's mother were cohabitating for at least 6 months before the period of conception and continue it
through the period of conception.").
44 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (1975) (effective Jan. 1, 2009) (presuming a man is the father
if he "receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child."); lAw. REV.
STAT. § 584-4 (a)(4) (2014); IND. CODE § 31-14-7-2 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 257.55(1)(d) (2014); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.051(1)(d); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:2(V)(d) (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9:17-43(a)(4)-(5) (West 2014) (a man is "presumed to be the biological father of a child if he openly
holds out the child as his natural child" and either "receives the child into his home" or "provides sup-
port for the child."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-304(a)(4) (2010).
45 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(5).
46 ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(A)(5).
47 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Constitutional Constraints on Second Parent Laws, 40 OHIo N.U. L.
REV. 811, 822, 839 (2014). Acquiescence may be unnecessary where, for example, de facto parenthood
arises due to the abandonment, unfitness, or mental impairment of the biological or adoptive parents.
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tal acquiescence to nonparent childcare resulting in a "substantial relation-
ship" or the presence of "some embodiment of family."
III. THIRD-PARTY CHILDCARE LAWS
Addressing possible third-party, nonparent childcare over current paren-
tal objections, a rather broad South Dakota statute allows "any person other
than the parent of a child to intervene or petition a court ... for custody or
visitation of any child with whom he or she has served as a primary care-
taker, has closely bonded as a parental figure, or has otherwise formed a
significant and substantial relationship."4 8 In South Dakota, a parent's
"presumptive right to custody" is lost when there is abandonment or persis-
tent neglect; forfeiture or surrender of parental rights to a nonparent, abdica-
tion of "parental rights and responsibilities," or, "extraordinary circum-
stances" where parental custody "would result in serious detriment to the
child."49 In Kentucky, a "de facto custodian" of a child can seek custody if
he or she was "the primary caregiver" and "financial supporter," resided
with the child for at least six months, and the child is less than three years
old.s In Colorado, nonparents have standing to seek an allocation of paren-
tal responsibilities when the nonparent "has had the physical care of a child
for a period of [six months] or more."'"
There are special third-party childcare statutes that apply only to steppar-
ents (both present and former). 2 A rather narrow Illinois statute requires
48 S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 25-5-29 (2002).
49 Id. The statute was applied to permit visitation favoring a man with no biological or adoptive ties. See
also S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 25-5-33 (2002) (parent can be ordered to pay child support to nonparent
having "custodial rights"). Compare Clough v. Nez, 759 N.W.2d 297, 299, 302-03 (S.D. 2008), with
Veldheer v. Peterson, 824 N.W. 2d 86, 94 (S.D. 2012) (denying statutory visitation to maternal grand-
parents over paternal objections).
so Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1)(a) (West 2014) (residence for at least one year is required if the
child is three or older). Thus, not all de facto parents can qualify as de facto custodians with standing to
seek childcare. See, e.g., Spreacker v. Vaughn, 397 S.W.3d 419, 420 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (paternal great
aunt is de facto custodian); Truman v. Lillard, 404 S.W.3d 863, 865, 869-70 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (for-
mer same-sex partner of woman who adopted her niece was not a de facto custodian and failed to show
a waiver of superior parental right to custody). There are similar laws in Indiana and Minnesota. MINN.
STAT. § 257C.03(1-2) (2014) ("de facto" custodian); K.S. v. B.W., 954 N.E.2d 1050, 1051 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011) (employing Indiana Code § 31-9-2-35.5). The phrase "de facto custodian," and similar
phrases, can also be used in other settings. See, e.g., In re Jesse C., No. C069325, 2012 WL 5902301, at
*4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2012) (de facto parent is one who cares for child during dependency proceed-
ing; de facto parent status is lost when dependency is terminated).
1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(1)(c) (2014); see, e.g., In re B.B.O., 277 P.3d 818, 819 (Colo. 2012)
(half-sister has standing); In re D.T., 292 P.3d 1120, 1121 (Colo. App. 2012) (mother's friend did not
gain standing as she "served more of a grandmotherly role, rather than a parental role" and as mother
never ceded her parental rights).
52 Beside special statutes, there are some common law rights regarding childcare for some former step-
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that a child be at least 12 years old, a marriage of at least five years, and a
custodial parent unable to "perform the duties of a parent to the child,"5 for
a stepparent to get a childcare order. By contrast, in a Tennessee divorce, "a
stepparent to a minor child born to the other party . .. may be granted rea-
sonable visitation rights . .. upon a finding that such visitation rights would
be in the best interests of the minor child and that such stepparent is actual-
ly providing or contributing towards the support of such child."5 4 In Cali-
fornia, "reasonable visitation to a stepparent" is permitted if in "the best in-
terest of the minor child."" In Oregon, during a dissolution proceeding, a
stepparent can obtain custody or visitation by proving "a child-parent rela-
tionship exists," the presumption that the parent acts in the child's best in-
terest has been "rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence," and the
child's "best interest" will be served." If a stepparent only proves "an on-
going personal relationship" with the child, the parental presumption must
be rebutted by "clear and convincing evidence." In Utah, a former "step-
parent""can obtain childcare in a divorce or "other proceeding"59 by show-
ing "clear and convincing evidence" that, inter alia, the stepparent "inten-
tionally assumed the role and obligations of a parent;" formed "an
emotional bond and created a parent-child type relationship," contributed to
the "child's wellbeing," and showed the parent is "absent" or has "abused
or neglected the child."60 In Delaware, "upon the death or disability of the
custodial or primary placement parent," a stepparent who resided with the
deceased or disabled parent can request custody even if "there is a surviving
parents. See, e.g., Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d 731, 733, 736-38 (Ark. 2011) (former lesbian partner
obtains child visitation order; court relies on Robinson v. Ford-Robinson, 208 S.W.3d 140 (Ark. 2005),
where stepmother was able to seek visitation with stepson over father's objection as long as visitation
was in the child's "best interest," deemed the "polestar consideration").
5 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/601(b)(3)(A)-(C) (2014). Other requirements for stepparent childcare in Illi-
nois include, inter alia, 5 year residence of the parent and stepparent, the child's desire to live with the
stepparent, and the child's best interests. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(b)(3)(B),(E), (F). Special steppar-
ent childcare laws, of course, may be coupled with special stepparent adoption laws. See, e.g., LA.
CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1252(A) (2014) (no need for even limited homestudies in some stepparent adop-
tions); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-4-302(1)(a) (2014) (stepparent has lived with child and a parent with
legal and physical custody for past sixty days).
54 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-303(a) (2014).
5 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3101 (West 2014).
56 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119(3)(a) (West 2014). "Child-parent relationship" means a relationship,
within the past 6 months, that "fulfilled the child's psychological needs for a parent as well as the child's
physical needs." OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119(10)(a) (West 2014).
5 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119(3)(b). An "ongoing personal relationship" means "a relationship with
substantial continuity for at least one year, through interaction, companionship, interplay and mutuality."
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119(10)(e) (West 2014).
51 UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-102(2)(e) (LexisNexis 2014).
5 UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-103(4) (LexisNexis 2014).
60 UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-103(2).
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natural parent." 1 In Virginia, a former stepparent with a "legitimate inter-
est"62 can secure custody of or visitation with a child upon a "showing by
clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of the child would be
served thereby."63
Comparably, there are special third-party childcare statutes that apply on-
ly to grandparents. 64  For example, in Alabama, under certain conditions a
grandparent can obtain court-ordered visitation with a grandchild when the
marriage of the child's parents has been dissolved, one or both parents are
dead, or the child was born out of wedlock. 5 In Alaska, visitation can be
sought by a grandparent who "has established or attempted to establish on-
going personal contact" with the grandchild.66 In Arkansas, a grandparent
or great-grandparent has standing to seek visitation if the "marital relation-
ship between the parents . . . has been severed by death, divorce, or legal
61
separation. In Georgia, a grandparent can obtain visitation if the court
finds "the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless visitation
is granted" and the child's best interests would be served. 8 In North Dako-
ta, under statute: "The grandparents and great-grandparents of an unmarried
minor child may be granted reasonable visitation rights to the child ... up-
on a finding that visitation would be in the best interests of the child and
would not interfere with the parent-child relationship."69 Seemingly, these
grandparent childcare statutes must be read narrowly in order to comply
with the Troxel demands on respecting the "liberty interests of parents."
61 DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 733 (2014).
62 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2008 & Supp. 2014) (providing that other persons with "legitimate inter-
est" include grandparents, step-grandparents, stepparents, former stepparents, blood relatives, and family
members).
63 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (2008 & Supp. 2014); see, e.g., Brown v. Burch, 519 S.E.2d 403,405-06,
412 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (holding, over mother's objection, that "clear and convincing evidence of spe-
cial and unique circumstances" justified joint custody order favoring father and stepfather, with the latter
"retaining physical custody of the boy.").
64 At times grandparents have childcare standing regarding their grandchildren though the parental
rights regarding their children have been terminated. See, e.g., Porter v. Hill, 844 N.W.2d 718, 718
(Mich. 2014) (father's parental rights had been terminated before the father's death).
65 ALA. CODE § 30-34.1(b) (1975).
66 ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.065 (2014).
67 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (1987) (effective July 31, 2009).
68 GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(c)(1) (2014) (citing harm may be found where "the minor child resided with
the grandparent for six months or more" or where "there was an established pattern of regular visitation
or child care by the grandparent with the child").
69 N.D. CENT. Code § 14-09-05.1(1) (2013), deemed constitutional in Kulbacki v. Michael, 845 N.W.2d
625, 628 (N.D. 2014) (holding trial court must give parents a favorable presumption and place the bur-
den of proof on grandparents or great-grandparents), applied in S.B. v. Bjerke, 845 N.W.2d 317 (N.D.
2014).
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Special childcare laws can extend beyond grandparents and stepparents
to other family members where grandparents and stepparents may also be
included. For example, in Florida "an extended family member" may bring
an action for temporary custody of a minor child, with such a member in-
cluding a "relative within the third degree by blood or marriage to the par-
ent" or "the stepparent of a child if the stepparent is currently married to the
parent.""o In Oregon, "any person . . . who has established emotional ties
creating . . . an ongoing personal relationship with the child may petition"
for a childcare order. 1 The aforementioned Utah stepparent childcare stat-
ute also comparably covers siblings, aunts, uncles and grandparents.72
On occasion a third-party childcare order can be pursued where the ulti-
mate goal has little, if anything, to do with childcare. For example, a New
York trial court in 2001 appointed the prospective maternal grandparents as
guardians of an eight month old fetus, with the consent of the prospective
parents, while issuing a "custody and visitation stipulation." 73 The guardi-
anship was pursued so that the fetus would be provided with medical cover-
age via the insurer of the grandparents.
The aforedescribed New York guardianship proceeding is unusual. A
more common form of statutory guardianship involves actual childcare in-
tentions, which overlap in certain ways with third-party childcare laws. A
2014 California appellate court describes that state's probate guardianship
scheme as follows:
After the passage of the juvenile dependency statutes, probate guardianships ...
provide an alternative placement for children who cannot safely remain with
their parents .... The differences between the probate guardianships and de-
pendency proceedings are significant.. .. Probate guardianships are not initiat-
ed by the state, but by private parties, typically family members. They do not
entail proof of specific statutory grounds demonstrating substantial risk of harm
to the child, as is required in dependency proceedings .. . . Unlike dependency
cases, they are not regularly supervised by the court and a social services agen-
cy. No government entity is a party to the proceedings. It is the family mem-
bers and the guardians who determine, with court approval, whether a guardi-
anship is established, and thereafter whether parent and child will be reunited,
or the guardianship continued, or an adoption sought ....
o Mohorn v. Thomas, 30 So. 3d 710, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (employing FLA. STAT. §751.01 et
seq. (West 2010) to recognize temporary custody of a child in a paternal grandmother).
7' OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109-119 (West 2013) (holding "clear and convincing evidence needed" to
overrule presumption "that the legal parent acts in the best interests of the child").
72 UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-102(2) (LexisNexis 2014).
71 In re Guardianship of Baby K., 727 N.Y.S. 2d 283, 286 (Sur. Ct. 2001).
74 Id.
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The probate court may appoint a guardian, "if it appears necessary or conven-
ient." . . . "A relative or other person on behalf of the minor, or the minor if 12
years of age or older, may file a petition for appointment of a guardian."...
When a parent objects to the guardianship, he or she is entitled to notice and a
hearing. (Prob. Code, § 1511.) "Early authorities held that in contested guardi-
anship cases, parents were entitled to retain custody unless affirmatively found
unfit . . . However, the unfitness standard fell out of favor and the best interest
of the child, as determined under the custody statutes, became the controlling
consideration ...
In determining the minor's best interests ... section 3040 [of the Family Code]
specifies the order of preference as: (1) joint custody or either parent; (2) a per-
son in whose home the minor is living in a wholesome and stable environment;
and (3) any person deemed suitable by the court who can provide adequate and
proper care and guidance for the minor.
Before granting custody to a nonparent over a parent's objection, "the court
shall make a finding that granting custody to a parent would be detrimental to
the child and that granting custody to the nonparent is required to serve the best
interest of the child." . . .
A finding of detriment does not require any finding of unfitness of the parents
. . A parent who loses ... custody ... is not foreclosed from regaining custody
based on changed circumstances."
State statutory guardianship schemes outside of California are compara-
ble. The American Law Institute said the following about the "Distinction
between custody decrees and those appointing a legal guardian of the per-
son:
Custody decrees and those appointing a legal guardian of the person create the
same sort of relationship between the child, or incompetent, and the person to
whose care is awarded. Custody decrees are frequently handed down in connec-
tion with or subsequent to, the divorce or separation of the child's parents. In
such instances, the child's custody is usually awarded to one of his parents or is
divided between them. On the other hand, a legal guardian is usually appointed
to take charge of an adult incompetent or of a child whose parents are dead, or
have deserted him, or who for some reason are incapable of caring for him.
Such a guardian therefore is usually someone other than a parent. In actual
practice, however, no sharp distinction may be drawn between the two kinds of
decrees. Thus, custody of a child is sometimes awarded to a person who is not a
parent, and, under some statutes, a parent may be appointed legal guardian of a
child's person. 76
15 In re Guardianship of Richard C., No. B247332, 2014 WL 1316684, at *4, *7 (Cal. App. 2d 2014).
Compare id., with Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235, 237 (2000) (grandparents guardianship can be based
on proof of gross misconduct, abandonment, or unfitness of a parent, or on "exceptional circumstanc-
es").
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §79 cmt. d (1971). Of course, a "distinction should
here be drawn between guardians of the person and guardians of the property of infants and incompe-
tents. The sole function of guardians of the property is to manage and conserve the property committed
to their charge." Id. at cmt. e.
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In some instances there are third-party childcare orders, perhaps over pa-
rental objections, where state officials are left no choice but to end parental
childcare in order to avoid anticipated harm to the child. Here, third-party
caretakers may not petition for childcare; rather, they are called upon by the
state to provide childcare because of the unavailability of parental childcare.
For example, in Louisiana, if "custody to either parent would result in sub-
stantial harm to the child, the court shall award custody to another person
with whom the child has been living... or otherwise to any other person
able to provide an adequate and stable environment."7
In addition to statutes addressing third-party childcare standing and
guardianships, there is also case law precedent that recognizes future child-
care interests in nonparents who have earlier provided care for the child,
and perhaps acted like parents, but who are not designated as parents under
law. For example, in Ohio, there can be no "shared parenting" contracts be-
tween parents and nonparents.7 However, "a parent may voluntarily share
with a nonparent the care, custody, and control of his or her child through a
valid shared - custody agreement," which may create for a nonparent "an
agreement for permanent shared legal custody of the parent's child" or an
agreement for temporary shared legal custody, like when the agreement is
revocable by the parent.79 In Minnesota, the high court has recognized, un-
der certain conditions, a common law right to visitation over parental objec-
tion for a former stepparent or an aunt who stood "in loco parentis" with the
child. 0 In New York, a grandparent has standing to seek visitation with a
grandchild over parental objection when "conditions exist which equity
would see fit to intervene."
1 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (2013). Compare id., with Gansen v. Phillips, No. 304102, 2012 WL
1939758 at *1 (Mich. App. Ct. May 29, 2012) (citing Hunter v. Hunter, 771 N.W.2d 694, 713 (Mich.
2009)) (stating that even where there is an "established custodial environment" involving a child and a
third party, the parental custody presumption favors the parent unless the third party demonstrates by
clear and convincing evidence that custody with the parent is not in the child's best interest).
7 In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 245-46 (Ohio 2002).
* Hobbs v. Mullen (In re Mullen), 953 N.E.2d 302, 305-06 (Ohio 2011); see also In re Bonfield 780
N.E.2d at 249 (stating that custody in the non-parent is only allowed under an agreement when the Juve-
nile Court deems the non-parent suitable and the shared custody is in the best interests of the child); In
re LaPiana, Nos. 93691, 93692, 2010 WL3042394 at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2010) (holding that
former lesbian partner could secure visitation with 2 children born of assisted reproduction based on
written agreement to raise the first child jointly and evidence of intent to share custody of both children);
Sharp v. Stevenson, No. W2009-00096-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 786006 at *5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar.
10, 2010) (using a case where a child's grandparents who were named as primary residential parents in
a parenting plan did not show permanent ceding to demonstrate the difficulties in distinguishing whether
an agreement signifies temporary or permanent ceding of parental authority).
o Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 593 (Minn. 2012).
I Van Norstrand v. Van Norstrand, 925 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Domestic Relations
Law §72[1]); see also In re Victoria, 56 A.3d 338, 343 (Md. Ct. Spec. App 2012) (reviewing precedents
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Some of the aforementioned third-party childcare laws seemingly present
significant problems under Troxel. For example, the Tennessee, Virginia,
and California stepparent visitation laws do not expressly require "harm or
potential harm to the child" or "special weight" to parental wishes.8 2 Com-
parably problematic are the Alabama and Alaska statutes on grandparent
childcare when read literally.83
IV. REVISITING TROXEL
De facto parenthood laws suggest new approaches to meet the Troxel
"special weight" requirement for new parent childcare orders notwithstand-
ing current parental objections. New parentage designations without bio-
logical or formal adoption ties, but with the child's best interest served,
have often been justified by an earlier ceding of parental authority, demon-
strated by consent to or acquiescence in the development of parental-like
relationships between the children and nonparent caretakers who later be-
come new parents. Thus, a birth or formal adoptive parent's earlier wishes
or other voluntary acts regarding a nonparent's childcare diminishes the
weight accorded later parental objections when possible new de facto par-
entage is considered.84 In this scenario, there does not need to be harm to
the child for a new second parent to be recognized.
The impact of earlier parental ceding of childcare authority on later judi-
cial deference to parental wishes was aptly described by the New Jersey
Supreme Court as follows:
on when sibling visitations can be ordered over parental objections, as related to grandparent visitation
standards), aff'd in part and vacated in part 88 A.3d 749, 765 (Md. 2014) (holding that to gain visitation
with half siblings over parental objections, adult child had to show lack of visitation would have signifi-
cant, deleterious effects on half-siblings).
82 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3101 (West 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-303 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
124.1 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (2008). But see In re Marriage of W., 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003) (California statute is unconstitutional as applied to stepparent visitation order made
without applying presumption favoring parental objections).
8 ALA. CODE § 30-34.1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.065 (2014).
84 The earlier parental acts may have occurred before the child's birth, as with a pact between a same sex
female couple on the employment by one of the partners of assisted reproductive technologies. Such pre-
birth acts are deemed by some judges as best left to the legislature as judicial involvement opens the
door wide and waves everyone-including neighbors and even baby sitters-into parenthood. See, e.g.,
Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 579 (Ky. 2010) ("we adjudge there can be a waiver of some
part of custody rights demonstrating an intent to co-parent a child with a nonparent," declared in a case
involving assisted reproduction and a lesbian couple's pact); id. at 583 (J. Cunningham, concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("judicial engineering undermines the statutory protection of the parent and
opens the door wide for all third parties who can show shared participation in child rearing," including
"grandparents, uncles, aunts, neighbors and even babysitters").
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This opinion should not be viewed as an incursion on the general right of
a fit legal parent to raise his or her child without outside interference. What we
have addressed here is a specific set of circumstances involving the volitional
choice of a legal parent to cede a measure of parental authority to a third party;
to allow that party to function as a parent in the day-to-day life of the child; and
to foster that forging of a parental bond between the third party and the child. In
such circumstances, the legal parent has created a family with the third party
and the child, and has invited the third party into the otherwise inviolable realm
of family privacy. By virtue of her own actions, the legal parent's expectation
of autonomous privacy in her relationship with her child is necessarily reduced
from that which would have been the case had she never invited the third party
into their lives. Most important, where that invitation and its consequences have
altered her child's life by essentially giving him or her another parent, the legal
parent's options are constrained. It is the child's best interest that is preeminent
as it would be if two legal parents were in a conflict over custody and visita-
tion."
Comparably, the necessary weight accorded current parental objections
to childcare by stepparents, grandparents, and other nonparents can be di-
minished in third-party childcare disputes if earlier parental wishes or other
voluntary acts facilitated "bonded and dependent" relationships8 6 between
the children and the nonparents whose continuing childcare would serve the
best interests of children. A finding of a need to avoid harm or potential
harm to a child would be unnecessary. Current parental objections to con-
tinuing third-party childcare could be afforded less weight where the parent
earlier consented to a child custody transfer to the third party."
The 2002 American Law Institute (ALI) Principles recognized that such
diminished weight could be accorded current parental objections to contin-
ued third party childcare." They recognized that current objections to
third-party childcare by fit single parents could be overcome where the par-
ents had not been "performing a reasonable share of parenting functions"
and grandparents or other relatives developed "significant" relationships
" V.C. v. M.J.B, 748 A.2d 539, 553-54 (N.J. 2000). A comparable rationale (also involving, as in V.C.,
a former lesbian couple) was employed in Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010), unfortunate-
ly characterizing the voluntary ceding of parental authority to an intimate partner as acting "inconsistent-
ly with" the "paramount parental status," but not employed in Sides v. Ikner, 730 S.E.2d 844 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2012), finding that parent did not intentionally chose to create a parental role for a grandparent).
See also Massitto v. Massito, 488 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio 1986) (only look to child's best interest in childcare
dispute where father earlier consented to guardianship by maternal grandparents, with his consent incor-
porated into the father's divorce decree).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §8-201(c) (2014) (requirements for "de facto parent status").
8 See, e.g., S.M. v. R.M., 92 A. 3d 1128 (D.C. App. 2014) (no such consent here as birth mother was led
to believe she was agreeing to temporary custody while she attended drug treatment program).
"AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.18 (2002).
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with the children.89 This recognition embodies the view that passive acqui-
escence by a single parent in the development of such a relationship limits
later parental decision-making on the continuation of such a relationship.90
The ALI Principles also recognized that diminished weight in childcare dis-
putes could be accorded to the current objections of a single parent (often
an unwed birth mother) who earlier agreed with a biological parent of a
child who "is not the child's legal parent" (often a man whose sex with the
single birth mother prompted the birth of the child) that such a nonparent
"retained some parental rights or responsibilities".91 In both settings, the
ALI Principles contemplated that there need not be "harm to the child" for
childcare responsibilities to be judicially assigned to nonparents.92
In accordance with these principles, and comparable to many de facto
parent laws, court-compelled continuing third-party childcare over current
parental objections can be justified when there was earlier parental acquies-
cence in the childcare and when the child's best interests will be served
even though the absence of such continuing childcare will not prompt
"harm or potential harm to the child."
While findings as to the best interests of a child should always precede
any court-compelled third party childcare, state lawmakers who want to
recognize more than the minimal requisites of parental "liberty interests"
could demand there also be judicial findings of harm or potential harm to
children preceding any such childcare. However, a demand like this would
be nonsensical in some settings; for example, where state lawmakers had
not required comparable findings of harm or potential harm before second
parents could be newly-recognized, parental "liberty interests" are more
significantly devalued than they are in third party childcare settings.
State lawmakers who desire more secure parental "liberty interests"
could also demand express, rather than implicit, parental consent to earlier
third-party childcare, as well as a preexisting "substantial relationship" be-
tween a child and nonparent. Further, legislators could differentiate be-
tween the standards applicable to varying third parties; for example, by
making standing easier to attain for a grandparent than standing for a former
step-grandparent or former stepparent, because only in the former setting
does a family relationship necessarily continue.
" Id. at § 2.18(2)(a).
90 See id.
9' Id. at § 2.18(2)(b).
92 Id. at § 2.18(2)(c) ("harm to the child" can by itself support judges allocating childcare responsibility
to nonparents over current parental objections).
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By contrast, state lawmakers could opt to recognize less secure parental
"liberty interests." They could choose, for example, to recognize for some
children (and perhaps for some nonparents) "fundamental liberty interests"
in "preserving established familial or family-like bonds."
Deference to parental "liberty interests" can also be calibrated by the de-
gree of proof required to overcome current parental objections to third-party
childcare. For example, in contemporary grandparent visitation laws, either
a preponderance of the evidence93 or clear and convincing evidence94 stand-
ard could be used. Of course, different standards could be employed for
different issues in the same third-party case, where a higher standard is re-
quired for the norm on earlier parental acquiescence and a lower standard
for the norm on the current nature of the child third-party relationship (e.g.,
"established familial or family-like bonds").95
V. CONCLUSION
State legislators and judges need not require "a showing of harm or
potential harm to the child" when considering a third-party childcare order
over a parent's current objection where the parent earlier ceded some paren-
tal authority to the third party. Less "special weight" can be accorded to
current parental wishes where parents have ceded some parental authority
than where there was no earlier ceding of parental authority. The best inter-
est of a child could be served without unduly limiting the "liberty interests
" See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (2015) (gmndparent who petitions a court for a "reasonable"
grandchild visitation order must overcome a parental objection by a "preponderance of the evidence" as
to a "significant and viable relationship" with the grandchild and as to the grandchild's "best interest"
being served with such an order); In re J.R.A., No. 13CA18, 2014 WL 5089173, at *5, 22 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2014) ("In a child-custody proceeding between a parent and a nonparent, a court may not award
custody to the nonparent without first determining that the parent is unsuitable to raise the child, i.e.,
without determining by a preponderance of the evidence that the parent abandoned the child, contractu-
ally relinquished custody of the child, or has become totally incapable of supporting or caring for the
child, or that an award of custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child.").
9 See also Mullins v. Neely, No. 2013-CA-001876-ME, 2014 WL 2938621, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014)
(waiver of superior parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence). Compare Hunter v. Hunter,
771 N.W.2d 694, 713 (Mich. 2009) (no grant of child custody to third parties unless third parties
"demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence" that paternal custody "does not serve the children's'
best interest"), with VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (2008).
15 E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(a)-(e) (West, 2007). A child custody award to a third party, over paren-
tal objection, generally requires a finding that parental custody "would be detrimental to the child,"
which must be "supported by clear and convincing evidence." Yet, where by a preponderance of the
evidence the third party has been shown to have "assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of ... parent,
fulfilling both the child's physical needs and .. . psychological needs for care and affection . .. for a
substantial period of time," this finding means "parental custody would be detrimental to the child ab-
sent a showing by a prepondemnce of the evidence to the contrary." Further, "the evidentiary standards"
differ when "the child is an Indian child." Id.
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of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children." Reasonably,
however, state lawmakers may eliminate the need for harm for only certain
third parties petitioning for childcare, like current grandparents or steppar-
ents.
248 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVIII:ii
